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John R. Commons’s Industrial Relations: Its 
Development and Relevance to a Post-Industrial 
Society 
 




John R. Commons was born in 1862 into a violent 
industrializing world, and he struggled with the labor problems of 
that world. He died in 1945--five years before the United States 
officially became a post-industrial society-- with new labor problems 
needing new solutions1. The industrial worksite with its lifetime 
employment and its Taylorist hierarchy broke down over the years-- 
and with it the New Deal industrial relations that had seemed 
permanent when Commons died (Kochan, McKersie and Katz 1986, 
Cobble 1994). In the post-industrial workplace distinctions between 
labor and management blur and external labor markets replace 
internal markets. Temporary help, contract workers, and simple 
downsizing replace lifetime employment. Global capital markets 
threaten national labor markets, and income gaps widen. Proponents 
of privatization question the value of any labor laws (Reynolds 1987). 
It seems natural to ask how ideas Commons developed many years 
ago can have any relevance to these new problems.  
This paper argues that they can. Some have a timeless 
relevance, and others apply to certain “back to the future” aspects of 
the contemporary work environment. To make that argument, the 
paper detours through Commons’s life because of the way his ideas 
developed. Commons created a synthesis working continually more 
complex variations into themes developed early in his life. The best 
way to appreciate his synthesis is to follow its development. The first 
part of the paper tries to do that. The Second part argues that his 
work remains relevant because his most general principles deal with 
rapid change which is a constant characteristic of capitalist society, 
and because his concrete proposals gain a new currency from some 
"back to the future" aspects of recent labor market changes. 
 
1
A post-industrial society is defined as one in which more than fifty percent of the 
workers are in service industries. Daniel Bell (1976) seems to have invented the term. 
He describes the term this way: “The two large dimensions of a post-industrial society, 
as they are elaborated in this book, are the centrality of theoretical knowledge and the 
expansion of the service sector as against a manufacturing economy” (Bell 1976, p. 
xix). While manufacturing has remained a relatively constant fraction of GDP, the 
fraction of the labor force employed in service industries exceeded 50% in the United 
States in the 1950 census, and it has continued to grow. Consequently, according to 
the definition, the United States officially became a post-industrial country in 1950. 
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1. The Development of his ideas 
 
Commons’s professional life falls easily into three periods. An 
early period began with his graduate studies and ended in 1904 with 
his arrival at the University of Wisconsin; a second ended in 1916 
with his minority report for the United States Commission on 
Industrial Relations. A final period of reflection and synthesis closed 
when he died.  
 
 The early period: 1888 to 1904 
   
In graduate school, Commons studied the historical 
methodology of the German economists and the marginal methods of 
their Austrian opponents. His teacher, Richard T. Ely, social reformer 
and founder of the American Economic Association stressed the 
value for democratic reform of voluntary organizations outside the 
formal structure of the state. Ely defended unions because they 
counteracted the weakness of individual workers bargaining with 
large corporations (1890, p.14). One of Ely's colleagues, Henry Carter 
Adams, seeking a role for government in a market society, coined the 
term “competitive menace” (Adams 1954, p.89). When firms compete 
on price, Adams argued those employers least ethical in their labor 
practices become low cost producers, forcing others down to their 
level. The competitive menace, the weak bargaining position of the 
worker, and the role of voluntary organizations all became constant 
themes in the synthesis that Commons eventually worked out. 
Commons left graduate school without a degree, lost three 
academic jobs in quick succession, and bounced around from one 
temporary position to another. During this early period, Commons 
worked out positions on the state and on collective bargaining. In 
Proportional Representation, Commons maintained that a system of 
regional representation would not respond well to working class 
concerns. Candidates seeking election in a geographic area succeed 
not so much by representing the pressing needs of a single group as 
by blandly avoiding controversy. But it is impossible to press the 
needs of the working class without controversy. Consequently, the 
government of the United States will not adequately respond to 
working class concerns. In A Sociological View of Sovereignty (1967) 
Commons, used British parliamentary history to explore the 
evolution of a state from monarchy to popular representative 
democracy2. States emerge to control the incentive of violence. Over 
 
2 Between the years 1899-1900, Commons wrote a series of articles in the American 
Sociological Review In 1967, Joseph Dorfman gathered these articles into a book 
entitled A Sociological View of Sovereignty. People familiar with Commons’s work often 
refer to it as The Sociology of Sovereignty. 
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time, the state extracts that incentive from other organizations. It 
strips families of the right to abuse children, clergy of the right to 
torture and execute heretics, employers of the right to beat slaves, 
and so forth. These organizations must rely on persuasion to press 
their points of view. In its control of violence, the state operates 
according to the principles of justice held by the dominant groups 
that control it. Excluded groups struggle to enter the governing 
coalition, and as they battle their way in, notions of justice broaden 
and grow more adequate Commons was to rework the theme of an 
evolving notion of justice many times in his professional life. 
In his last job before going to the University of Wisconsin, 
Commons worked as a mediator for the National Civic Federation, an 
organization interested in solving problems through labor-
management cooperation. While working for the Federation, 
Commons developed a belief in collective bargaining as a partial 
solution to the problems he had identified in Proportional 
Representation. Strong unions could force employers to follow on the 
industrial level the political process outlined in the A Sociological 
View of Sovereignty. 
When Ely Called him to Wisconsin therefore, Commons came 
with ideas about the competitive menace, the political weakness of 
labor in the United States, an evolving imperfect concept of justice, 
and the value of collective bargaining as a way to overcome the 
political weakness of labor. 
 
 Historical Vision and Policy Proposals 1904-1916 
 
Commons arrived at the University of Wisconsin in 1904 to 
supervise a history of labor in the United States. He collaborated in 
reforms that made Wisconsin a leader in social legislation, and he 
summarized his view of industrial relations in a minority report to 
the United States Commission on Industrial Relations. His work on 
the history of labor produced a theory of economic evolution 
incorporating the competitive menace. 
In an influential article, "The American Shoemakers," and in 
the first two volumes of the History of Labour in the United States, 
Commons and a group of exceptional students worked out a theory 
of capitalist evolution that emphasized "external conditions of 
marketing or production" as the major cause of the changing face of 
the competitive menace, and the growth of new organizations 
(Commons 1909, p. 40). Improvements in transportation and 
anticipated sales induce merchants to extend markets for different 
products. But the extension of markets increases the area within 
which the competitive menace can force working conditions to the 
level of the least ethical producer (Commons 1909, p. 68-69). Tasks, 
once performed in single firm, are parceled out to specialized 
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organizations-- financial tasks to bankers, supply functions to 
individual contractors, repetitive work to home producers or 
contractors. The increasing number of intervening concerns masks 
an underlying conflict between producer and consumer. Monopoly 
and monopsony power move back and forth in the chain separating 
producers and consumers. Those with monopoly or monopsony 
power force purchasers or suppliers into competition with each 
other. To escape the competitive menace, those forced into this 
position develop protective organizations. Those with monopoly or 
monopsony power then turn to the state to restrict freedom of 
association (Commons 1909, p. 61). Much of this happens, 
Commons noted, without the Marxist catalyst of technical change. 
While Henry Carter Adams had used the concept of the competitive 
menace to justify government regulation of the conditions of 
production, Commons used it to explain the rise of unions and other 
protective organizations. The concept of the competitive menace was 
a continuing underlying theme of “The American Shoemakers.” In 
one section that begins with the title “The Level of the Competitive 
Menace,” Commons wrote: 
“Defining the “marginal producer” as the one with the lowest 
standards of living and cost and quality of work, he is the 
producer whose competition tends to drag down the level of 
the others toward his own. It is not necessary that he be able 
to actually supply the entire market or even the greater part 
of it. His effect on others depends on the extent to which he 
can be used as a club to intimidate others against standing 
out for their side of the bargain. He is a menace rather than 
an actual competitor” (Commons 1909, p. 68) 
 
In the very next section entitled “Protective organizations,” 
Commons chronicled the efforts of the American shoemakers to form 
organizations that would protect them from what Commons called 
“the competitive menace.” The historical vision of almost 
unpredictable change implies the need for a policy apparatus that 
can recognize new problems and respond quickly. 
 
The search for such an apparatus guided Commons's work in 
the Wisconsin State Government and later as a member of the 
United States Commission on Industrial Relations. The commission 
was established to investigate the age of industrial violence in the 
United States (Adams 1966). . Members of the ironworkers union 
were dynamiting bridges around the country. Their officers blew up 
the headquarters of the Los Angeles Times. Members of the National 
Guard fired on striking workers in Ludlow, Colorado, killing women 
and children, and as a result, violence erupted in the minefields of 
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Colorado. Violence accompanied strikes in the New York, Patterson, 
New Jersey, and Los Angeles. 
Commons’s membership on the commission is significant for 
two reasons. His minority report summarized a policy position that 
remained virtually unchanged for the rest of his life, and as the 
commission’s tenure neared its end, Commons became embroiled in 
a dispute traumatic enough to almost completely destroy his 
physical and mental health. 
The dispute at the end climaxed a long-standing difference 
between, the chairman, Frank Walsh, a crusading pro-labor 
attorney, and Charles McCarthy, the research director and a close 
friend of Commons3. Walsh wanted to stir up public indignation by 
exposing the corporate causes of the labor problem. McCarthy, who 
had recruited a staff of outstanding social scientists, wanted to craft 
policy prescriptions for solving the problem. As a football player at 
Brown University years earlier, McCarthy had become fast friends 
with the team’s student manager, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Rockefeller 
now owned the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, the company 
responsible for the Ludlow massacre. Moreover, Rockefeller had put 
the resources of the Rockefeller Foundation behind an Industrial 
Relations initiative that would run counter to the committee’s more 
radical proposals. Walsh asked McCarthy to investigate. McCarthy 
wrote a letter to Rockefeller telling him he had nothing to worry 
about. Walsh found the letter. From Walsh’s legal viewpoint, this was 
unethical. When funds grew short, Walsh fired McCarthy, and with 
him, his outstanding staff. Commons was the only member of the 
commission to defend McCarthy. One staff member, the brilliant 
labor economist Robert Hoxie, committed suicide. This traumatic 
public policy experience may explain why Commons began trying to 
remain in academia and to work on a more theoretical level. Another 
reason may be that he had already reached most of his policy 
conclusions summarized in his minority report to the committee 
(Commons and Harriman 1916). 
The heart of those proposals is a National Industrial 
Commission separate from the labor department. Career civil 
servants chosen on the basis of competitive examination should staff 
the commission. But the staff should respond to an advisory board 
whose members would be chosen as follows: ten representing 
employer organizations; ten unions; and ten non-governmental 
 
3 Adams (1966, pp. 204-214) provides the most complete summary of the dispute. The 
account in Commons’s autobiography is not accurate. It may be that at the age of 
seventy Commons had erased from his mind all the unpleasant aspects of this 
episode, particularly the questionable behavior of his friend, Charles McCarthy. Even 
reading between the lines of the autobiography, however, it is possible to discover the 
extent of the psychological trauma that his participation created for Commons. 
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organizations concerned about the welfare of unorganized workers. 
As examples of the latter, Commons cited the International 
Association for Labor Legislation, the Child Welfare League, and the 
Consumer League. Commons laid out specific procedures for 
involving the advisory board in initiation, review, and revision of staff 
investigations. He argued that public hearings are ineffective for 
controlling bureaucratic inertia. 
 Commons patterned this Commission after the Industrial 
Commission of Wisconsin, which was responsible for industrial 
health and workers’ compensation. The insurance part of workers’ 
compensation was the responsibility of a mutual insurance company 
created for that purpose. Commons hoped that heavily merit rated 
mutual insurance would reverse the competitive menace. The safest 
employers would have the lowest premiums; hence the lowest costs 
of production. 
The main task of the National Commission would be 
investigation and legal revision, but the Commission would also be 
responsible for administration. Commons pointed out that the 
separation of functions among different agencies at the state level 
resulted in overlapping jurisdictions and inadequate enforcement. He 
proposed a broad sweep of legislation including occupational health 
regulations, a national employment system, compulsory health 
insurance, unemployment insurance, and other elements of a 
national welfare policy. He proposed a mediation service appointed 
by the Commission (Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 206). Once 
appointed, the chief mediator would be independent of the 
Commission. For Commons, it was vital that all sides view the 
Commission as strictly nonpartisan. 
 For this reason, he rejected government-imposed arbitration, 
specifically excluding the type prescribed by the Canadian Disputes 
Investigation Act of 1907 (Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 211).  
The mediator could appoint an arbitrator if the two sides asked for 
one. Commons made this concession grudgingly because once the 
arbitrator made a decision, the losing side was likely to view the 
arbitrator, and, by extension, the Commission as biased toward the 
winning side. Such a view on the part of the losers was bound to 
threaten the credibility of the Commission. 
In assigning a role to government, Commons distinguished 
union from non-union workplaces. In the case of individual 
contracts, where workers are at a disadvantage, Commons proposed 
that government should intervene with child labor laws, worker 
compensation laws, mechanics' liens, occupational health laws and 
other laws designed to protect the workers’ weak bargaining position. 
  But where unions were organized, Commons held that the 
government should level the playing field and step back. He criticized 
laws of his day for giving employers an unfair advantage. He seemed 
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to believe, though, that the path to correction was not to constrain 
employers, but to remove constraints from unions. He advocated 
legalization of every possible union tactic short of violence. He 
advocated changing the anti-trust laws to permit centralized 
bargaining between organized employers and organized unions. This 
implied revising laws against conspiracies in restraint of trade in the 
case of the wage bargain (Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 214-
215). That is, Commons advocated centralized industry wide 
bargaining with economic power equal on both sides, and with the 
government strictly neutral. This reflected his belief that unions 
would lose in the political arena unless they first cultivated public 
opinion. 
. . . . if the State recognizes any particular union by 
compelling the employer to recognize it, the State must 
necessarily guarantee the union to the extent that it must 
strip it of any abuses that it may practice. The State might be 
compelled to regulate its initiation fees and dues, its 
apprenticeship ratio, its violation of agreements, and all the 
other abuses on account of which the employer refuses to 
deal with it. This is exactly what is done through compulsory 
arbitration, and there is no place where the State can stop if 
it brings compulsion to bear on employers without regulating 
the compulsion of unions. If so, the whole question is 
transferred to politics, and the unions, which attempt to use 
a friendly party to regulate the employer, may find a hostile 
party regulating them (Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 
212). 
Consistent with his view that external circumstances 
aggravate conflicts within firms, Commons took his proposals beyond 
the labor market (Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 225-8). He 
advocated integrated rural development and limits on immigration to 
reduce the flow of workers into the cities. He called for a series of 
laws to "take control of politics out of the hands of the corporations 
and place it in the hands of the people." He advocated corrupt 
practices acts, campaign finance reform, and proportional 
representation, which would permit the formation of a labor party 
and a women’s rights party.  
It may have been the trauma of the disagreement that marred 
the committee’s proceedings. It may have been the complete mental 
and physical breakdown that he suffered as a result. It may simply 
have been a desire to work out more theoretical ideas. In any case, 
Commons seemed more willing after the commission was disbanded, 
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 1916-1945 Synthesis and Generalization 
 
After 1916, though still involved in the progressive turmoil of 
his time, Commons focused on synthesizing his life of research and 
experience in an institutional economics. He argued that 
transactions, not individuals should be the smallest unit of analysis 
because individual decisions always reflect a social history and an 
organizational role. For industrial relations, the relevant transactions 
surround the wage bargain. The evolution of social norms first 
described in A Sociological View of Sovereignty appeared again in his 
development of two normative concepts: public purpose and 
reasonable values. In the Legal Foundations of Capitalism, he placed 
the wage bargain in the context of public purpose In Institutional 
Economics, he applied his notion of reasonable value to the problem 
of finding policies in labor markets threatened by new forms of the 
competitive menace 
The most quoted sentence in The Legal Foundations of 
Capitalism appears in the chapter on the wage bargain.  
Apparently a "new equity" is needed--an equity that will protect 
the job as the older equity protected the business."(Commons 
1924, p. 307) 
Commons never clearly defined this "new equity." Rather, he 
described a process by which a society could work toward it. He 
started with a history of legal decisions guided by a notion of a public 
purpose; then he argued that the right to collective bargaining 
should be part of that public purpose. He followed the evolution of 
laws governing the wage transaction; from acceptance of indentured 
servitude and slavery to the employment at will principle. Then he 
moved to the history of property rights. In tracing the history of 
property rights, Commons reviewed a number of cases in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated state court decisions because they 
deprived the complainants of property without due process of law. 
The Court insisted that due process implied not just formal 
procedures, but fidelity to the purpose of the law --the public 
purpose. When the personal rights of workers were at stake, 
however, the Supreme Court did not require attention to the public 
purpose. Commons drew the following conclusion. 
“Thus property rights are deemed so important for national purposes 
that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the federal court to 
protect them against the states. But personal rights, including as 
they do, the rights of workingmen and others when property rights 
are negligible, are deemed to be less important for national purposes 
and may be left to the states” (Commons 1924, p. 341). 
Before he developed his argument for including rights of 
workers in the public purpose, Commons tried to nail down an 
operational meaning for the term public purpose itself. Organizations 
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exist for goals that can be formulated in a general way with words 
such as “social welfare, public good, commonweal, and 
commonwealth.” These terms, though, are “vague and indefinite” 
providing “no certain guidance in particular cases” (Commons 1924, 
p. 381) 
In seeking “guidance for particular cases,” Commons denied 
the existence of any public purpose or general will apart from the 
wills of individual people. The welfare of a person or a group becomes 
a public purpose simply by being so classified (Commons 1924, p. 
372-3). Originally the public purpose meant only the welfare of the 
king (1924, p. 324). Over time, courts included private rights of 
merchants and manufacturers within the public purpose. The courts 
did not make those decisions by deduction from some general idea. 
Rather, they focused on undesirable aspects of their current 
environment. These were factors limiting attainment of a goal only 
dimly anticipated. Historically, rulers and courts assumed that the 
limiting factor was the scarcity of capital or business ability.  
Commons then set out to show that workers’ rights to collective 
bargaining should be classified within the public purpose. He pointed 
out that Adam Smith defined the wealth of nations as the annual 
labor of the nation. Moreover, Smith declared that per capita wealth 
depends on the "skill, dexterity, and judgment with which labor is 
generally applied," and on the ratio of unproductive to productive 
labor (Commons 1924, p. 362; Smith, p. 395). Smith wanted to free 
workers from the restrictions of guilds, landlords, and corporations. 
He did not foresee the emergence of huge corporations protected by 
limited liability. Limited liability laws permitting the growth of 
corporations weakened the bargaining position of individual workers, 
and now collective bargaining was closer to Smith's ideal than 
unequal wage bargains between single workers and large 
corporations (Commons 1924, p. 363). 
In Institutional Economics, Commons added to the concept of 
public purpose an intensive analysis of reasonableness as a guide to 
public policy. He rejected John Locke's reasonableness based on 
natural rights or on what a reasonable person would conclude. If 
that were true, Commons objected, there would be as many 
reasonable values as there are people. In addition, people are not 
reasonable all the time, but operate from habit and custom. People 
can be “stupid, passionate and ignorant” (Commons 1934, p. 680-
682). By mentioning John Locke, Commons recalled how he had 
begun Institutional Economics – with John Locke’s reaction to the 
wars of religion and his search for a way to replace dogmatic 
intolerance with "reasonableness in all things"(Commons 1934, p. 
14). But Locke’s theory of knowledge hindered his search for 
reasonableness because it ended in David Hume's skepticism and 
relativism. Commons solved the problem of skepticism and relativism 
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by adopting Charles Sanders Peirce's definitions of meaning and 
truth. Peirce’s definition of meaning is famous. "Consider what 
effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object."(Commons 1934, 
p. 151, Peirce 1992, p. 132). Peirce’s “practical bearings” were 
scientific, not utilitarian. For Peirce, the Michaelson-Morley results 
would be practical bearings from the theory of relativity. Peirce 
defined truth as “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed 
to by all who investigate" (Commons 1934, p. 153, Peirce 1992, p. 
139). To adapt Peirce's philosophy to Locke's search for 
reasonableness, Commons, following John Dewey, changed Peirce’s 
"practical bearings" to "desirable social consequences," or a public 
purpose (Commons 1934, pp. 150, 655). Since unborn generations 
have not weighed in, truth about public purpose and reasonable 
value is always provisional. Its improvement depends on processes 
designed to encourage open intellectual inquiry into all the evidence 
from all points of view at each historical moment. 
As an example of processes so designed, Commons pointed to 
legal procedures. Courts make “new law by taking over the changing 
customs of the dominant portion of the people at the time and 
formulating them by a rationalizing process of justification into 
working rules for collective action in control of individual action" 
(Commons 1934, p. 682). For anyone familiar with the A Sociological 
View of Sovereignty, the term "dominant portion of the people" 
implies that reasonable value must be provisional--changing when 
new groups muscle their way into the "dominant portion of the 
people." Commons had a philosophical basis for the democratic 
principles he had outlined forty years earlier, and he had a 
philosophy of policy analysis, which he summarized after 200 pages 
of further elaboration. 
“The theory of reasonable value may be summarized, in its 
pragmatic application, as a theory of social progress by means of 
personality controlled, liberated and expanded by collective action….” 
 “Unregulated profit-seeking drags the conscientious down 
towards the level of he least conscientious; yet a considerable 
minority is always above that level, no matter how high it may have 
been raised by collective action. These indicate the possibility of 
progress.” 
“The problem, then, is the limited one of investigating the 
working rules of collective action which bring reluctant individuals 
up to, not an impracticable ideal, but a reasonable idealism, because 
it is already demonstrated to be practicable by a progressive minority 
under existing conditions” (Commons 1934, p. 874). 
Trade unions, farm cooperatives, and other such 
organizations, Commons added, though they cover only a small 
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percentage of the working population "elevate their members to a 
higher sense of responsibility for each other" (Commons 1934, p. 
874). Commons later argued that unions are among the strongest 
forces protecting democratic processes and opposing totalitarian 
tendencies in government (Commons 1950, p. 262). 
Thus, the final variation on the themes developed early in his 
career, took the form of a historical vision resulting in a policy 
prescription. When Commons wrote that “Unregulated profit-seeking 
drags the conscientious down towards the level of the least 
conscientious,” he was returning to the competitive menace—and the 
possibility of a downward social spiral to inequality and violence 
(Commons 1909, p. 68). He also returned to the possibility of 
progress first outlined in A Sociological View of Sovereignty. New 
groups struggle to bring their conceptions of justice into the dialogue 
that defines the evolving but always-flawed public purpose. In his 
final synthesis, public purpose and reasonable value are integrated 
into a pragmatic philosophy of policy formation supported by Peirce’s 
concept of truth as the objective of social inquiry. 
In The Legal Foundations of Capitalism Commons defined the 
task of policy analysis in general terms to be one of finding and 
removing the factor limiting progress toward the public purpose. In 
this way societies evolve by what Commons called artificial selection. 
Authorities encourage desirable customs and discourage undesirable 
customs in the light of what they believe at the time to be factors 
limiting the attainment of dimly understood public purposes (1924, 
p. 377). Removal of the correct limiting factor ushers in a condition 
generally accepted as better than the previous condition. A new 
limiting factor, perhaps a new public purpose, emerges. In 
Institutional Economics, he brought policy analysis down to a 
concrete research agenda of finding “the progressive minority,” and 
reversing the competitive menace so that the "progressive minority,” 
leads. These leaders emerge from organizations such as unions and 
farm organizations as well as from business elites. Consequently 
freedom of association must always be part of the public purpose. 
Case studies must seek out the solutions developed by the 
“progressive minority” so they can be adapted to other situations—
always accounting for similarities and differences. 
 
2. Contemporary Relevance 
 
Jerald Hage and Charles Powers reasoned that sociologists 
still find relevance in the writings of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, 
Ferdinand Tonnies, and Vilfredo Pareto because they lived and wrote 
during the “golden age of sociology,” the years of great discontinuity 
from 1890 to 1930, and as a result, their concepts and frameworks-- 
anomie, bureaucracy, ideal types, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft--
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contain insights into discontinuity itself, and so retain validity in the 
current era of discontinuity (Hage and Powers 1992, p. 1). The same 
reasoning might apply to John R. Commons who worked out his 
concepts and frameworks between 1890 and 1930. The labor market 
pathologies that bothered him--low wages, unemployment, 
underemployment, internal contracting, and massive turnover—
afflict the labor markets of today. Ulrich Beck points out that the 
unemployment and underemployment experienced by developed 
economies since 1980 were “the normal case” in the 19th century 
(Beck 2000, p. 12). Scott Lash and John Urry mention the 
predominance of internal contracting in the early 20th century United 
States (Lash and Urry 1987, p. 164-165). Commons and his student 
William Leiserson described massive turnover in Pittsburgh 
industries (Commons and Leiserson 1914, p. 116-117). The 
reasoning of Hage and Powers could thus justify the claim of 
relevance for some of Commons’s concepts—“transactions,” 
“competitive menace,” “representation of interests,” “limiting factor,” 
“public purpose,” and “reasonable value.” The contention of relevance 
can be strengthened by pointing out how these concepts could cast 
fresh light on current problems, and how, in the United States, 
reformers, unaware of his suggestions for labor law reform, are 
rediscovering them. 
Oliver Williamson found Commons’s concept of transactions 
relevant for industrial organization (Williamson 1975, pp. 3, 254)4.4 
But Williamson, concerned with efficiency, paid little attention to way 
Commons explained how an unpredictably changing complex of 
transactions can generate an arbitrarily shifting competitive menace. 
Commons focused on simple economic processes like making 
and selling shoes. People rarely buy shoes from a shoemaker. Rather 
consumers stand at one end of a complex set of transactions, and 
workers at the other. Between workers and consumers are managers, 
wholesalers, transportation companies, retailers, management 
consultants, stockbrokers, investment bankers, commercial bankers, 
individual stockholders, and pension fund managers. Individual 
firms merge and split unpredictably. In addition, sovereign power 
enforces rights and duties, and monetary authorities control 
aggregate activity through the money supply (Commons 1950, p. 43-
57). The competitive menace appears when those with economic 
 
4 Williamson read Institutional Economics. But he did not read Commons’s earlier 
works without which some aspects of Institutional Economics cannot make sense. 
Williamson accepted Commons’s statement that the transaction should be the 
smallest unit of analysis, but he did not consider relevant Commons’s other 
terminology that Commons used, particularly Commons’s statement that the 
transaction should be analyzed from an economic, a legal, an ethical, and a 
psychological perspective. Consequently, he missed Commons’s rationale for arguing 
that the wage transaction is not free but coercive. 
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power in this complex set of transactions force those without 
economic power to compete, increasing the returns of the powerful at 
the expense of the powerless. For Commons, expanding markets 
shifted power around in this complex of transactions, and with it the 
arbitrarily shifting menace of competition. 
The menace of competition may conveniently be described as 
external and internal. The former arises within the area of the 
existing market, the latter proceeds from cheap producers 
abroad. With the ever-widening area of political control these 
external menaces become internal, and it is this moving 
frontier that determines the scope and character of protective 
organizations and protective legislation (Commons 1909, 
p.78) 
Some current research supports the relevance of the 
transaction as Commons used it to explain “the menace of 
competition.” James Galbraith, disputing attributions of wage 
disparity to educational disparity or to global competition, showed 
that capital equipment and software companies paid higher wages 
than service companies or goods producing companies—at all skill 
levels (Galbraith 1998). Then he showed that capital equipment and 
software companies have the most monopoly power and that service 
companies have the least. Companies with monopoly power can 
share some of their gains with their workers. Those with none, face 
the competitive menace, ---though Galbraith did not use that term. 
Joel Nelson (1995) argued that the post-industrial growth of 
managerial knowledge endowed corporations with power because 
that knowledge is expensive. Large corporations can afford to buy 
knowledge and management expertise which they use to invade 
national markets, driving down prices and consequently wages. Of 
particular interest are “hollow corporations,” such as Nike, Pierre 
Cardin, or Polo. They consist only of managers who develop and 
market products produced by subcontractors who must compete for 
contracts. Large retailers such as Wal-Mart are able, not only to 
destroy small retail establishments with which they compete, but 
also to force their suppliers to compete for contracts (Nelson 1995, p. 
67-68). Wal-Mart is not the only firm that forces its suppliers to 
compete on price. William Finnegan writes that between 1980 and 
1995, the total assets of the world’s 100 largest corporations 
increased by 697 percent, while their direct labor force fell by 8%. 
Production was shifted to contractors and subcontractors who must 
compete on price. Expensive knowledge is also essential for 
politicians, and since corporate contributions supply the finances to 
buy that knowledge, corporate control over political decisions has 
expanded (Nelson 1995, p. 105-131). As companies expand to 
become what Scott Lash and John Urry called polycentric 
multinationals, the competitive menace can reach sovereign states 
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forced to compete through “ ‘free production zones’ offering all sorts 
of exemptions, reliefs, preferential rates, tax holidays and the like” 
(Lash and Urry 1987, p. 90). 
 Commons’s attention to power imbalances in transactions 
and to the resulting competitive menace could improve current 
explanations for labor market pathologies. Ulrich Beck seems to 
attribute rising unemployment and underemployment to 
technological unemployment in which “smart technology” replaces 
workers (Beck 2000, p. 2). The problem with this explanation is that 
for many years, technology replaced workers in manufacturing 
industries, but economies maintained full employment because 
employment in service industries rose. Beck also writes that “Capital 
is global,” and “labor is local” and that, as a result “working people 
are losers in the battle to distribute risks of globalization” (Beck 
2000, p. 47). This supports Commons’s emphasis on market 
expansion and the changing power relationships in the set of 
transactions that separate the price bargain from the wage bargain. 
On the other hand, Beck’s statement appears to depend on mobility 
of capital argument, but that argument does not explain falling 
wages of construction workers or low wages for home health care 
workers, child care workers, and restaurant and hotel employees. 
None of these people face global competition. Interestingly, Commons 
and Leiserson, in their Pittsburgh study found mobile labor and 
immobile capital when immigrants flood into a country for unskilled 
labor jobs (Commons and Leiserson 1914, p. 116). There are other 
explanations for unemployment and underemployment. The most 
common is the deficiency in aggregate demand. Commons mentioned 
such policies in the context of sovereignty and the money supply 
(Commons 1950, pp. 43-48, 239-260).  
  Beck and Anthony Giddens, dismiss any potential for full 
employment demand management because of increasing 
international economic interdependence (Beck 2000, p. 70; Giddens 
1990, p. 76). Neither Beck nor Giddens seems to have paid much 
attention to post-Keynesian literature that attributes stagnation, 
unemployment and underemployment to contractionary policies by 
central banks and governments---leading to international liquidity 
shortages (Block 1990, Eisner 1996, Wray 1998)5. 5  
 From Commons’s analytical framework it is possible to 
propose three related explanations for public policies that lead to 
 
5 Giddens (2000, p. 37) seems to have changed his mind about the usefulness of 
aggregate demand management—though he still does not seem to understand the 
implications of a liquidity shortage (2000, p. 73). Giddens also calls for an 
international central bank, but, again, he does not deal with the problem that all the 
central banks can cause if they focus on preventing inflation to the exclusion of other 
goals (Giddens 2000, p. 127). 
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liquidity shortages. The first explanation, the thesis of Proportional 
Representation, states that a system of spatial representation cannot 
respond to the views of all who are affected by government decisions. 
The quasi-governments of the global economy are the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the two Bretton Woods organizations—the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In all these 
organizations, decisions depend on representatives of nation states, 
with decision making power tilted toward the richer states. Even less 
developed countries, however, are represented by westernized elites 
who would not be inclined to represent their own subsistence 
farmers or labor unions. The second explanation stems from 
Commons’s position that limited liability creates permanent 
imbalances of political or economic power (1924, p. 363). Their 
political power automatically places corporate decision-makers in the 
dominant class able to impose their notions of justice on public 
entities. The third and related explanation for policies creating 
international liquidity shortages stems from Commons’s position that 
an imperfect public purpose reflects the vague objectives of the 
dominant class. Based on experience in the seventies dominant 
classes concluded that inflation was the limiting factor preventing 
attainment of their vaguely defined public purpose. The WTO, the 
IMF, the World Bank , and national central banks operate on 
principles of justice held by the dominant class. Those principles 
were summarized until recently in the Washington consensus. 
 The shortcomings of this consensus and of its implied public 
purpose are gradually becoming apparent as intellectual critiques 
buttress street demonstrations (Stiglitz 2002, Finnegan 2003). 
Within Commons’s framework, one would say that it is time to find 
another limiting factor, one that would permit conception of a more 
adequate public purpose for the global community, and for 
Commons the path toward finding a more adequate concept of that 
public purpose lies along the direction pointed out by C.S. Peirce, the 
direction that allows consideration of the evidence and views of all 
who inquire, in Commons’s terminology, the search for reasonable 
value, or reasonableness 
 “reasonableness is best ascertained in practice when 
representatives of conflicting organized economic interests, 
instead of politicians or lawyers, agree voluntarily on the 
working rules of their collective action in control of individual 
action” (Commons 1950, p. 25).  
The structure Commons suggested for his Industrial 
Commission should not be blindly applied to the international 
agencies, but it embodied two principles-- representation of interests 
and technical investigation by a competent staff protected by civil 
service status from political influence. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have technical staffs, but their basic 
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direction is set in a way that falls woefully short of the principle of 
representation of interests. The World Trade Organization, almost 
mysterious in its secrecy, and the strange in its structure, violates 
both principles. Repeated violent protests attest to a widely held 
belief that these international organizations act unjustly because 
they represent the interests of large corporations. And, as if the ghost 
of Commons whispered in their ears, some suggest representation of 
other interests in the decision making circles of these organizations 
(Finnegan 2003, p. 54). Anthony Giddens criticizes the power of the 
large governments in international organizations, and he also 
criticizes the authoritarian nature of some governments in the less 
developed world (Giddens 2000, pp. 128-9). But he does not proceed 
to the need for representation of affected interests such as workers 
and farmers in these countries. 
 Of course, representation assumes freedom of association, 
and the gist of Commons’s proposals for the National Industrial 
Relations Commission was that in many ways the laws of property 
inhibit freedom of association. One might argue for a revival of the 
International Association for Labor Legislation in which Commons’s 
student, John B. Andrews played such an important role (Chasse 
1991). 
 Anthony Giddens assumes this freedom of association, but 
does not explicitly set it as a condition for his “utopian idealism,” and 
he considers the role of social movements under the rubric of what 
he calls he four poles of modernity (Giddens 1990, p. 158-163). To 
counter the negative effects of information control in the modern 
state, he posits free speech and democratic movements. To counter 
the negative effects of capitalism, he posits labor movements. To 
counter the negative effects of industrialism, he posits ecological 
movements, and to counter the effects of military power, he posits 
peace movements. To counter the effects of capitalism, he posits 
labor movements. Full freedom of association is the necessary 
condition for any of these movements to become effective. Giddens’s 
utopia, therefore, depends on Commons’s insistence that freedom of 
association, particularly for workers, should not be curtailed, but 
Giddens never attends to the legal roadblocks hindering the 
effectiveness of organizations that challenge the dominant class6. 
 Commons’s argument for including the right to collective 
bargaining within the public purpose gains relevance in light of 
current arguments for removing it (Reynolds 1987). Opponents of 
collective bargaining rest their case on the counterexample of the free 
wage bargain. They ignore the privilege of limited liability and the 
implication, drawn out by Commons that one worker does not have 
 
6 As I write this, troops are firing on workers and farmers in Peru because they oppose 
the policies of their president, a former World Bank economist. 
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the bargaining power of one corporation, and the corporation exists, 
not because of free market forces, but because of the privilege of 
limited liability. 
 Evidence both for the relevance of Commons’s methods exists 
in proposals of people who today propose policies to correct the anti-
labor bias of American laws, unaware that Commons proposed the 
same policies a hundred years ago. 
 In addition to suggesting a tripartite structure for the National Labor 
Relations Board, Richard Block argues that the United States needs 
a separate tripartite national commission to investigate labor 
practices and to suggest changes that keep labor laws abreast of a 
changing work environment. This normal maintenance, Block claims, 
would fill the role played by parliamentary debate in systems such as 
Canada’s (1994, p. 158-9). Commons made precisely the same 
argument when he proposed his National Industrial Commission 
(Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 187). Dorothy Sue Cobble 
suggests removal of restrictions on union tactics, and a removal of 
the need for union certification as a pre-requisite to bargaining 
(1994, p. 296-297). Commons had suggested removal of all 
restrictions on union tactics. 
Cobble also suggests centralized collective bargaining. Together with 
the National Industrial Council, centralized bargaining was the 
centerpiece of the system Commons proposed in his minority report 
for the National Industrial Relations Commission. Recently, 
arguments in favor of such a system have been strengthened by 
comparisons between the United States and the European Union. 
Over the past 20 years, the lowest ten- percent of the work force 
fared better in Europe than in the United States. Lawrence Katz and 
Richard Freeman attribute part of the difference to centralized union 
contracts in Europe (Freeman and Katz 1993). And, investigators for 
the European Community found that centralized bargaining removes 
and in some cases reverses any negative effects of unionization on 
employment (European Commission 1999, p. 137). It is 
disconcerting, therefore, to find that centralized bargaining is 
breaking down in Europe (Lash and Urry 1987, pp. 237-262).  
 In addition, some crucial events have borne out his specific 
predictions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) does not embody Commons's philosophy. In 
The Economics of Collective Action He changed his opposition to any 
government role in collective bargaining enough to admit the need for 
some sort of “labor court” (Commons 1950, pp. 266, 276). But he 
advocated tripartite control of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) (Commons 1950, p. 275). The business community, in the 
Taft-Hartley amendments secured restrictions on union tactics, and 
a passage guaranteeing individual rights that contradicted the right 
of collective bargaining. The result politicized the National Labor 
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Relations Board. By 1986, the fiftieth anniversary of the NLRA, the 
president of the AFL-CIO complained that labor would rather see 
NLRB disbanded so all could "return to the law of the jungle" (Cited 
in Holley and Jennings 1994: 
 … The unions which attempt to use a friendly party 
to regulate the employer may find a hostile party 
regulating them (Commons and Harriman 1916, p. 
212). 
 Of course the similarity between many current policy 
proposals and those of Commons does not mean that his policy 
proposals could be woodenly applied today. In fact, reflecting on the 
history of unions up to the 1960s, one of Commons’s best students 
eventually disagreed with Commons’s insistence that unions stay out 
of politics. David Saposs argued that unions need state protection 
and that they must engage in political activity to prevent anti-union 
legislation (Saposs 1966). Rather, the rediscovery of his conclusions 
tends to validate the principles by which he reached them. Indeed, 
those principles stressed processes of inquiry rather than concrete 
conclusions. They were, in fact, principles for dealing with the 
restlessly evolving challenges of a capitalist economy. 
 And those principles still seem to apply. James Galbraith’s 
demonstration that monopoly power explains wage disparities better 
than education or skill backs up Commons’s picture of an 
unpredictably changing complex of transactions generating an 
arbitrarily shifting competitive menace driving down working 
conditions in individual labor markets. Joel Nelson’s thesis on the 
competitive effect of managerial knowledge strengthens the 
pertinence of that picture as does the “disorganized capitalism” of 
Scott Lash and John Urry. Unemployment, underemployment, and 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies can be explained by 
Commons’s concepts of public purpose and limiting factor together 
with his position that limited liability creates an economic imbalance 
of power. And his solution embodied in the principles of reasonable 
value and representation of interests finds echoes in proposals for 
reform of the major international financial institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 The major themes that Commons developed over a lifetime, 
therefore, retain their ability to enlighten inquiries into the nature of 
current issues. Perhaps the greatest argument for this position lies 
in careful consideration of his life and its circumstances. He sought, 
not a criterion of justice but a process by which society could, over 
time, come to see injustices to which it had been blind. He conceived 
of the just society, in the fallibilist tradition of C.S. Peirce, as an 
unreachable limit toward which inquiry might tend, and that inquiry 
had to include representatives of all interested parties. It was a 
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radical view of democracy in the pragmatic tradition, and it implied 
industrial democracy. The relevance of his work can be further 
illustrated by showing how his key concepts—transaction, 
competitive menace, limiting value, public purpose, and reasonable 
value—provide enlightening perspectives on contemporary issues. 
The rediscovery of his solutions for current problems further 
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